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ADDITUR-PROCEDURAL BOON OR
CONSTITUTIONAL CALAMITY
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
The right to trial by jury is an integral part of the interstitial fabric of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The constitutional provisions, both state and
federal, ensuring this right were enacted to preserve the historic line separat-
ing the provifice of the jury from that of the judge, without at the same time
preventing procedural improvement which does not transgress this line. Judge
and jury are not antagonistic, but rather are complementary forces. Theirs is
a kind of symbiotic relationship. Perhaps all to often this is forgotten, and
courts, in defining the right to trial by jury, have had a tendency to erect
rigid lines of stratification between their spheres of operation. Yet, in reality,
no such precise demarcation is possible. As a consequence, the interaction and
dependence between the two is lost sight of and relegated to a place of
secondary importance, and inordinate emphasis is placed upon the jury as
a fact finding body without due regard for the judge's role in such determina-
tions.
This improper emphasis has had the unfortunate effect of partially pro-
scribing certain procedural devices which are predicated upon the harmonious
interaction between judge and jury and which seek to promote the fair and
efficient administration of justice in our courts. One such device is the
additur. Additur will be used in this comment to describe an order of the
trial court by which a plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of
inadequate damages is granted unless the defendant consents to an increase
of the award to an amount specified by the court. It is analogous to the
converse practice of remittitur. In remittitur situations, it is the defendant
who moves for a new trial, alleging that the damages awarded against him
by the jury are excessive. The court may grant the motion unless the plaintiff
consents to a decrease in the amount of the verdict rendered in his favor,
sufficient in the judge's opinion to cure the excess. Both additur and remittitur
are designed to inject greater parsimony into the judicial process by bringing
an excessive or inadequate award within the bounds of permissible recovery
without resort to a new trial with its concomitant temporal and economic
expense.
In both remittitur and additur situations the court, in concert with the
jury, plays a salient role in the ultimate determination of the monetary
award. However, since the issue of damages, like the issue of liability, is an
issue of fact to be determined by the jury, the use of an additur or remittitur
would seem to raise the constitutional issue of whether either party is de-
prived of his constitutional right to a jury determination on the issue of
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damages. The constitutionality of remittitur, as will be seen, has long been
upheld in this country, and since additur is the converse manifestation of
remittitur, one would expect its constitutionality to be equally settled.
Paradoxically, it is said that because the court has taken part in the ultimate
determination of the monetary award, the additur procedure deprives a non-
consenting plaintiff of his right to trial by jury. Although the same objection
may be asserted against remittitur, it has not been accepted by our courts.
This comment will demonstrate that additur, like its fraternal twin, remit-
titur, is a constitutionally permissible, as well as an expeditious procedural
device. It will analyze the soundness of the arguments which seek to sustain
additur and will illustrate the specious nature of those which would obviate
it. Any consideration of additur must necessarily entail an examination of
several related, though distinct and independent concepts. Since the justifi-
cation for, and the essence of, additur are inextricably linked to that of
remittitur, both conceptually and historically, any discussion of the former
must be preceded by an account of the genesis and growth of the latter.
Furthermore, since the practice of both remittitur and additur emenated from
the power of a court to grant an unconditional new trial, antecedent to an
analysis of additur must also necessarily be an exploration of the historical
development of a court's common law power to grant such new trials. Ac-
cordingly, this comment will first discuss the history of the English and
American courts' power to grant new trials outright where the award was
excessive or inadequate. It will then proceed to a discussion of the develop-
ment of and justifications for the remittitur, an understanding of which is,
indeed, the sine qua non of any proper evaluation of additur. With this
necessary background, it will then be possible to examine the additur in de-
tail, to show the line of its growth in the United States with special emphasis
on the Illinois posture, which is, it is submitted, not as yet finally resolved in
cases involving unliquidated damages. Finally, it will attempt to determine
the probable effects of the recent California Supreme Court's decision in
lehl v. Southern Pacific Co.,' which sustained the constitutionality of additur
in California.
COMMON LAW ORIGIN OF THE POWER TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL
FOR AN EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE AWARD
The now familiar Anglo-American system of damages had not developed
prior to 1066. Rather, a system of fixed money payments for various wrongs
flourished until about 1200 A.D. 2 Subsequently, in the English courts there
1- Cal. App. 2d -, 427 P.2d 988 (1967).
2 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY Or ENGLISH LAW 37, 50 (3d ed. 1923); HOLMES, TiE Com-
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began slowly to evolve the modern system of damages. Contemporaneous
with the development of the remedy of damages was the courts' use of juries.3
The jury was, at its inception, the very antithesis of what we know it
today. It was often quite large and was composed of men of the vicinage
where the transaction occurred. Their functions at this early date were pri-
marily those of witnesses and assessors of the damages. Thus, the trial judge,
a stranger to the actual affair, could hardly feel justified in correcting or
overturning the findings of the "witnesses" against one of their own neigh-
bors.4 This is but an adumbration of the history of the jury; however, it will
suffice to illustrate the etiology of, and what was then the practical necessity
for, the doctrine that the amount of damages is a "fact question" to be
decided by the jury.
The measure of damages was at that time a fact which the jury initially
determined with little restraint from the judge.3 Yet, as time passed, and the
law became more sophisticated and orderly, and the function of the jurors
was transmuted from that of witness to judicial fact finder, the courts sought
to exercise a tighter rein, and hence they began to weave an elaborate web
of doctrine to use in the process of close and careful supervision and control
of the jury's function of assessing damages. Ironically, their initial attempts
were circumscribed by their own earlier rule that damages was a fact question
for the jury. This rule, though originally the result of historical and pragmatic
exigencies, had become petrified, and at last elevated to the throne of dogma.
It seems not to have occurred to the early masters to investigate the genesis of
their rules of law, to compare them with their present needs, and to discard
the anachronisms. Rather, they were content to function as judicial auto-
matons, mindlessly repeating the shibboleths of their predecessors. 6 However,
the frequent injustices wrought by intemperate and uncontrolled jurors could
not be long endured. This, coupled with the courts desire to increase its power
MON LAW 3-32 (1881). 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 46-48
(2d ed. 1913).
3 See Treatises, supra note 2.
4 McCoumacK, DAMAGES § 6 (1935).
5 GRAAr, NEW TRIALS 2 (1854).
6 "Indeed, viewed macroscopically, the situation presents a common phenomenon well
known to the student of history. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time
establish a rule or formula. In the course of centuries, the custom, belief, or necessity
disappears, but the rule remains inviolate. It becomes canonized; its origins and there-
fore its meaning are ignored, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is
to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and
to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule having been ac-
counted for, enters upon a new career. The old form receives a new content, and in
time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning it has received. The subject under
consideration illustrates this course of events very clearly." See HOLMES, supra note 2,
at 8,
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and influence, prompted the courts to devise exceptions to the scholastic
formula that the assessment of damages was within the exclusive province
of the jury.
Thus, perhaps as early as 1351, the English courts began to exercise the
power to grant new trials where misconduct of the jury was involved.7 Soon
this became an inherent power of the courts and an accepted procedural
device. Still, the courts were loathe to extend this power into the area of
damages, and thus a jury determination, no matter how excessive or inade-
quate, could not be set aside. Gradually an alternative form of relief known
as the attaint developed.8 Seemingly by the end of the fourteenth century, the
attaint was being used where the amount of damages given by the first jury
was excessive. 9 The attaint was harsh and thus was given a limited operation.
It could be used only to reduce, not to increase damages, and it could be
barred if the plaintiff were to release the excess.' 0 By the sixteenth century,
the attaint was extinct, but it was destined to leave its odious imprint on
later procedure."'
It is important to note that almost from the beginning the judges had
played a part, small though it was, in the assessment of damages, and by the
fourteen hundreds the judges had made distinct inroads upon the jurors'
province of damages. 12 Finally in 1655, a court set aside a verdict on the
ground of excessiveness of amount of damages awarded by the jury.13 This is
the first reported case in which a new trial was granted on the basis of error
in the amount of the verdict.' 4 Eventually excessive damages became an inde-
7 POUND & PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW
167 (3d ed. 1927); BEALE, CASES ON DAMAGES 1-9 (3d ed. 1928). See also Washington,
Damages In Contract At Common Law, 47 LAW Q. REv. 345 (1931).
8 The attaint was a proceeding by which one complaining of a jury verdict could
have a second jury of twenty four knights retry the case. See McCoRMICK, supra note 4.
9 Washington, supra note 7.
10 Washington, supra note 7.
11 Id. See also text accompanying notes 21-23 infra.
12 Washington, supra note 7, at 354; See also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 477
(1934).
13 Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655) ; See also Washington, supra note
7, at 362; Comment, Additur in California-The Meaning of Dorsey v. Barka, 40 CALIF.
L. REV. 276 (1952).
14 In Wood v. Gunston, id., Chief Justice Glyn stated: "It is in the discretion of the
court in some cases to grant a new tryal, but this must be a judicial and not an arbi-
trary discretion, and it is frequent in our books for the Court to take notice of mis-
carriages of juries, and to grant new tryals upon them, and it is for the peoples benefit
that it should be so . . . ." There were numerous incidents of the courts granting
new trials on grounds other than jury misconduct prior to 1655. In fact, it appears to
have been common in Common Pleas long before this. "The reason why this matter
can't be traced further back is, 'that the old reports do not give any accounts of de-
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pendent and self-sufficing ground for granting a new trial. For many years,
however, new trials were limited to cases in which damages were liquidated,
and it was not until the seventeen hundreds that they were granted with
regularity in tort actions.15 By the middle of the eighteenth century, the
tendency toward extending the scope of the courts' control over the jury's
power to assess damages was manifest. Indeed in 1757, Lord Mansfield noted
that:
Trials by jury, in civil causes, could not subsist now without a power, some-
where, to grant new trials. If unjust verdicts were to be conclusive for ever, the
determination of civil property in this method of trial would be very precarious
and unsatisfactory. It is absolutely necessary to justice, that there should . ..
be opportunities of reconsidering the cause .... 16
Finally, by the latter part of the eighteenth century, the common law courts
of England had shorn their cloak of reticence and were unhesitatingly exer-
cising their power to grant new trials where the verdict violated some rule of
the law of damages.
Thus, by the time of the founding of the United States it was firmly
established in English common law that the courts possessed the discretion-
ary power to grant a new trial where the verdict was excessive as well as for
a melange of other reasons.' 7 This power was seen as a power to examine the
whole case on the law and the evidence with a view to attaining a result
consonant with justice. It was a power exercised in pursuance of a sound
judicial discretion without which the jury system would devolve into a per-
fidious and intolerable tyranny.'8
The considerations involved in determining whether a verdict is inade-
quate are manifestly the same as those involved in determining whether a
verdict is excessive.19 Thus, one would expect the courts to have granted
termination made by the Court upon motions.'" Bright v. Eynon, 97 Eng. Rep. 365, 367
(K.B. 1757).
15See Bender, Additur-The Power of the Trial Court to Deny a New Trial on the
Condition That Damages Be Increased, 3 CALM. W. L. REv. 1, 4 (1967).
16 Bright v. Eynon, supra note 14, at 366.
17 See Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436, 438 (1894); Wilson v. Everett, 139 U.S. 616,
621 (1891); See also MAYNE, DAMAGES 457-462 (2d ed. 1872); James, Remedies For
Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts: New Trial on Some or All Issues, Remittitur
and Additur, 1 DUQUESNE L. Rxv. 143 (1963).
18 See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941). See also
text accompanying note 16.
19Nussbaum v. Warehime, 333 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 979
(1964); DeFoe v. Duhl, 286 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1961); Kilmer v. Parrish, 144 Ill. App.
270 (1908); Emmons v. Sheldon, 26 Wis. 648 (1870). See also Wilkie, Personal Injury
Damage Verdicts: Supreme Court Rulings Since the Powers Rule, 47 MARQ. L. REV.
368, 376 (1964).
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new trials for inadequacy of damages just as they had come to do for exces-
siveness of award. The courts, however, uniformly refused to grant new trials
where the verdict was inadequate. One prominent authority noted in 1792
that "no case is to be met with, in which a new trial has in fact been granted
on Account of the Smallness of the Damages. '20 The reason most commonly
accepted by the authorities as to why the English courts refused to grant new
trials for inadequacy of award was "that new trials come only in the room of
attaints, as being an easier and more expeditious remedy, and no attaint
would lie for giving too small damages."' Whether the courts were aware
of the amorphous though continuing presence of the attaint in their procedure
is not known. In any event the rule became immutable, and its genesis lost
in the evanescent and protean shadows of the past.
The courts in the United States, from their inception, granted new trials
where the verdict was clearly excessive. 22 However, undoubtedly influenced
by the English precedents and the noxious traces of the attaint, the granting
of a new trial as a remedy for an inadequate jury verdict was somewhat
slower in developing. 23 In fact, early statutes in several of the states ex-
pressly prohibited inadequacy of damages as grounds for a new trial.
2 4
However, the rule has been for many years that the trial court has the same
discretion, power and duty in passing upon motions for a new trial on the
grounds of inadequacy of the damages as where the motion is predicated
upon excessiveness.
2 5
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF REMITTITUR
The development of a court's power to grant a new trial unconditionally
was closely paralleled by the early development of a power to grant a condi-
20 MAYNE, supra note 17, at 455; SAYER, DAMAGES 201 (1792); 4 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES
§ 1368 (9th ed. 1912).
21 It is also sometimes said that no verdict would be overturned on grounds of
inadequacy because juries did not underestimate damages. See Bolles v. Bloomington &
Normal Ry., Elec. & Heating Co., 130 Ill. App. 263 (1907). This of course begs the
question. Such reasoning is offered because of a court's lack of historical perspective
and/or to conciliate the mind to an illogical and invidious state of affairs.
22 The Commerce, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 33 (1872) ; Blanchard v. Morris, 15 Ill. 35 (1853).
See also Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 9 (1942).
23 MCCORMICK, supra note 4.
24 MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at § 18.
25 See Dimick v. Schiedt, supra note 12, at 488 (dissenting opinion); Rosiello v.
Sellman, 354 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1965); DePinto v. Provident Life Insurance Co., 323
F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963); McCoRMIcK, supra note 4, at § 18.
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tional new trial. 26 The American courts, state27 and federal, 28 trial2 9 and
appellate,30 early embraced the practice of remittitur, under which they
possessed the power to deny a defendant's request for a new trial on the
grounds of excessiveness of the damages awarded on the condition that the
plaintiff consented to remit that part of the award which the court regarded
as excessive. What was excessive was determined as a "matter of law" by the
court. 31 This power emanated both as a necessary antecedent and inevitable
consequence from its common law discretionary power to set aside an exces-
sive or inadequate verdict.3 2 Since the court had a general discretion as to
whether it would set aside a verdict and grant a new trial because of an
excessive verdict, it is not surprising to find that the court likewise came to
have the same discretion as to whether it would allow a remittitur, or, in lieu
thereof, order a new trial.
It is doubtful whether the practice of remittitur was extant in England
when the Federal Constitution was adopted in 1791.3 3 Thus, since the seventh
amendment3 4 preserves trial by jury as it "existed under the English common
law when the amendment was adopted,"35 it was early argued that to make
the decision of the motion for a new trial depend upon a remission of part of
the verdict is in effect a reexamination by the court, in a mode not known to
the common law, of facts tried by the jury and therefore violative of the
seventh amendment.
26 See Bender, supra note 15, at 5; Scott, The Progress of the Law-Civil Procedure,
33 HARV. L. RaV. 236 (1919).
27 Sandy v. Lake Street Elevated Ry. Co., 235 Ill. 194, 85 N.E. 300 (1908) ; North
Chicago St. Ry. v. Wrixon, 150 Ill. 532, 37 N.E. 895 (1894). See also Annot., 95 A.L.R.
1163 (1935); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 779 (1928); McCoRamcK, supra note 4, at § 19;
SEIWICK, supra note 20, at § 1330; Carlin, supra note 22; Comment, 10 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. (1953); Comment, 44 YALE L.J. 318 (1934); 21 VA. L. REV. 666 (1935).
28 The leading case is Blunt v. Little, 3F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
See also Northern Pacific R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1885); Arkansas Valley Land
and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889). See collection of cases in 6 MooRE,
FEDEaRAL PRAcTcic § 59.05(3) (2d ed. 1948).
29 McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 19 (1935).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, supra note 28, at 74.
83 Dimick v. Schiedt, supra note 12, at 484.
34 "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
35 Baltimore & Conn. Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
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This contention was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann.36 In substance, the Court's
justification for the practice of remittitur was that since the court had the
power to determine whether the damages awarded were excessive, it neces-
sarily had the authority to determine an amount that would not be excessive.
Consequently, in giving the plaintiff an option to remit the excess or submit
to a new trial, the court is not usurping the function of the jury by fixing the
amount of the recovery, but is merely indicating the greatest amount which
could be allowed to stand. The plaintiff, who has voluntarily accepted the
remittitur, is not prejudiced and therefore cannot complain of the court's
action. The defendant is deprived of no right, and since he is benefited by the
reduction he cannot object. The so called logical justification for remittitur
was advanced in Dimick v. Schiedt, where the Court said: "Where the verdict
is excessive, the practice of substituting a remission of the excess for a new
trial is not without plausible support in view that what remains is included
in the verdict along with the unlawful excess-in that sense it has been found
by the jury. . .. "37 Notwithstanding the many serious objections leveled
against the justifications for remittitur,38 it has become too deeply ingrained
in the fabric of American law to be abolished.
ADDITUR
As noted earlier, additur is the trial court's power to deny a plaintiff's
motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of the jury verdict if the
defendant consents to an addition to that verdict. It would seem to be but
the converse of the remittitur power as well as a logical step in the growth of
the law relating to unliquidated damages as remittitur was at an earlier date.
By simple parity of reasoning it would seem to follow that if a court can re-
fuse to grant a new trial to the defendant if the plaintiff will remit part of
an excessively high award, it can refuse to grant a new trial to the plaintiff if
the defendant will agree to add to an unreasonably low award. The plaintiff
may argue that he is denied his constitutional right to a second trial in which
a jury could set a properly high award, but this contention is no more
persuasive than the defendant's corresponding argument in the converse case
of remittitur.
Despite the logical nexus between remittitur and additur, the American
courts did not manifest the same solicitude for the latter as for the former.
3 6 Supra note 28.
37 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1934).
38 See Carlin, supra note 22, at 16. But see Comment, 44 YALE L.J. 318 (1934);
48 HARV. L. REV. 333 (1934); 33 MICH. L. REV. 138 (1934); 32 MICH. L. REV. 538
(1934); 21 NOTRE DA. LAW. 55 (1945).
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Indeed, additur did not make its first appearance until 1866 in the Illinois
case of Carr v. Miner,8 9 which was a case involving liquidated damages.
Additur did not appear in cases involving unliquidated damages or unascer-
tainable amounts until almost the turn of the twentieth century. 40
The attitudes of the state courts toward additur were and continue to 'be
pluralistic.4 1 In 1935 in Dimick v. Schiedt,42 the question of the validity of
additur with reference to the plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial on
the issue of damages was presented before the United States Supreme Court
for the first time. The Court, in a five to four decision, condemned the practice
of additur as unconstitutionally contravening the seventh amendment's com-
mand that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined . . . than
according to the rules of the common law." While the seventh amendment
is not binding on the states through the "due process" clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 43 the decision in Dimick has had a profound effect on almost
all state court decisions which have considered the question of additur. Thus,
it is imperative that this decision be examined before an understanding can
be gained of the attitude of the Illinois and other state courts toward additur.
Dimick was decided in what the late Justice Frankfurter has so aptly
called the "era of great, big, sterile absolutes.1 44 Once one understands the
mood of the times and the fact that the parochialism of some of the members
of the Court was translated into constitutional doctrine, it is not surprising
to find that "Dimick was based on an historical and logical analysis that was
open to serious question.1 45 In fact, the decision has been critized by almost
every commentator who has considered it. The Court's holding in Dimick
seems predicated on the "re-examination" clause of the seventh amendment
which states: "[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined . . .
than according to the rules of the common law." The majority opinion entered
into a protracted historical analysis of the common law prior to 1791 as it
applied to the power of a court to grant new trials. Since the power to order a
conditional new trial based on inadequate damages, as contemplated by
additur, is obviously dependent upon the antecedent power to order such a
new trial unconditionally, the Court felt itself inexorably drawn to the con-
clusion that since the latter did not exist the former could not.4 6 In effect, the
39 42 Ill. 179 (1886).
40 See Volker v. First Nat'l Bank, 26 Neb. 602, 42 N.W. 732 (1889).
41 See cases collected in Bender, supra note 15, at 20.
42 Supra note 37.
43 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875) ; Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 292 Ill. App. 434,
11 N.E.2d 657 (1937).
44 PnmLips, FELIX FRANKFURTER RF.snIscES 293 (1960).
45 Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co., 59 Cal. Reptr. 276, 280, 427 P.2d 988, 992 (1967).
46 See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
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procedure would constitute a reexamination of a jury question by a method
unknown to the common law.
The analogy of remittitur was urged, but the Court differentiated the
practices on two grounds: (1) the existence of some-though inconclusive-
English remittitur practice prior to 1791; and (2) the fact that in the case of
the remittitur "what remains is included in the verdict along with the unlaw-
ful excess-in that sense it has been found by the jury-and the remittitur
has the effect of merely lopping off an excrescence. ' 47 In contrast, the additur
is the "bald addition of something which in no sense can be said to be in-
cluded in the verdict.148 It is obvious from the general tenor of the whole
opinion in Dimick that the majority would have preferred to have disapproved
the additur on principles that would have equally condemned the remittitur.
However, realizing that the latter had become too firmly established by prior
decisions to be disturbed, they found it necessary to resort to the specious
differentiation they ultimately employed. The logical schism, which to the
majority was so patent, can only be described as the product of tendentious
sophistry. The verdict arising out of the remittitur procedure obviously is
no more that of the jury than that arising out of additur. In fact, it is only
the additur which retains all that was contained in a jury's verdict, and in
both additur and remittitur something is taken away from the litigant who
is relying on the verdict.49
It is submitted that the opinion in Dimick is most unsatisfactory and
should be carefully reexamined. It was the product of an era of inveterate
conservatism ° and of a Court with a parochial scope.5' It employed an
historical method which was dissonant with the hypostasis of enlightened
47 Dimick v. Schiedt, supra note 12, at 486.
48 Dimick v. Schiedt, supra note 12, at 482.
4 9 See Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E.2d 357 (1958).
50 Mr. Justice Frankfurter has described the situation thusly: "On the whole, courts
were looked to as our saviours. . . . It was the era in which the pretensions of the courts
in enforcing absolutes, which too often were dogmas, regarding arrangements that were
familiar in the judges' minds and lay warm in their assumptions, were put out of their
heads, out of their assumptions, and into the Constitution. . . ." PnILL1Ts, supra note 44.
51 The majority opinion was written by Justice Sutherland and he was joined by
Justices VanDevanter, McReynolds, Butler, and Roberts. It was this same group who,
in Morehead v. Tripaldo, came to the incredible, though ephemeral conclusion that
"[Tihe State is without power by any form of legislation to prohibit, change or nullify
contracts between employers and adult women workers as to the amount of wages to
be paid." 298 U.S. 587, 611 (1936). Yet, contrast the majority with the dissenters.
Mr. Justice Cardozo and Mr. Justice Brandeis joinded Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and
Mr. Justice Stone to form what Professor Prichett has called: "as distinguished a
foursome as ever sat on the high court," PRiCHETT, THE AFasUcAN CONSTITUTION 577
(1959).
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judicial scholarship and with prior Supreme Court opinions. 52 For the
majority in Dimick, the fact that there was no specific, concrete, recorded,
tangible precedent in English common law relating to additur settled the
question. The historical approach was for them merely to search the Year
Books for cases. They failed to notice that the Court had often sanctioned
practices as being consistent with the seventh amendment even though they
were found not to have been employed by the common law judges.53 The
method employed by the majority would result in blind reproduction and
imitation of the past. It would preclude all growth in the law. Their view of
history, in ignoring its dynamic aspects, was false and one-sided.5 4 "The
Year Books can teach us how a principle or a rule had its beginnings. They
cannot teach us that what was the beginning shall also be the end. ' 55
As noted earlier, remittitur was said not to deprive a defendant of his
constitutional right to have a jury assess the damages he must pay, because
he will pay less under such procedure than the amount which a jury initially
awarded by its verdict against him. Thus, he has been ostensibly benefited
by the procedural device of remittitur. By the additur procedure, the plain-
tiff, by consent of the defendant, receives no less, but in fact more, than the
jury awarded him by its verdict. To hold that the former method benefits the
defendant but that the latter does not benefit the plaintiff is incongruous. And
if "constitutionality is to be, in the final analysis, partially predicated on
benefit,5 6 then additur as well as remittitur is seen to be clearly consonant
with the right to trial by jury.
If the arguments used to sustain the constitutionality of remittitur are
52 In Dimick, the historical method was the organon of judgment for both the majority
and minority, but its application by each led to antithetical results. The majority, in
its interpretation of legal history, was content to treat as finalities antiquarian precedents.
The majority, however, found a stream of thought, a tendency, a movement toward a
goal. Which then is the truer use of historical method? Which exhibits the saner and
sounder loyalty? Shall the significance of events be determined by transporting them
to our own times and viewing them as if they were the product of our own day and
thought, or by viewing them as of the time of their occurrence, the product of their
era, the expression of its beliefs and habits? Shall we look for the rules by which we
are to live only in the past admitting of no encroachment save that sanctified by
history? It is inconceivable that anyone should, at this stage of constitutional develop-
ment, wonder about the answers.
53 See Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1930); Ex parte Peter-
son, 253 U.S. 300 (1919); Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R.R., 165 U.S.
593 (1896).
54 CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924).
551d. at 104-05.
56There is some indication, all the casuistry aside, that this may be one of the
justifications for additur as well as remittitur. See Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co.
v. Mann, supra note 28, at 74; Dimick v. Schiedt, supra note 12, at 492 (dissenting
opinion); Caudle v. Swanson, supra note 49.
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legally cogent, vis-h-vis the right to trial by jury, then corresponding argu-
ments used to sustain the additur process must also be since the two are
indistinguishable. To hold otherwise necessarily leads to the inequitable
and absurd conclusion that the plaintiff has a greater right to a jury verdict
than the defendant.5
7
It has been suggested by Professor Carlin that the argument in remittitur
cases that the defendant cannot object since he is benefited is specious. 58
Since, as noted above, the arguments applicable to remittitur are likewise
applicable to additur, if there is no benefit to the defendant in the former
there can be no benefit to the plaintiff in the latter. Professor Carlin believes
that there is no benefit in either case since it is possible that a second jury
might award a verdict differing in amount from that which is finally deter-
mined by the court to be not excessive or not inadequate as the case may be.
It is believed that the efficacy of this hypothesis depends upon an incorrect
assessment of that to which the litigants are entitled under a constitutional
provision granting the right to trial by jury.
In his noted article, Professor Carlin takes the posture that only "if the
amount of the verdict should be reduced [in remittitur cases] to the minimum
which the court would stand to permit, . . . [could it truly] be said that the
defendant had benefited by the reduction." 59 Conversely, it follows that in
additur cases, the plaintiff would actually be benefited only if the amount of
the verdict should be enhanced to the maximum which a court would allow to
stand. If we accept this thesis, we are inescapably led to the conclusion that
the defendant in a case involving remittitur is constitutionally entitled to pay
only the legal minimum, while a plaintiff in an additur case is constitutionally
entitled to receive the legal maximum; for, if any other sum were awarded,
his right to trial by jury would be violated since he might receive a greater or
have to pay a lesser sum, as the case may be, if the matter were decided by a
second jury. It is believed that these contentions are incorrect, and it will be
shown that they are not supported by either sound logic or by the case law
of those states where additur has been approved.
If, to satisfy the non-consenting plaintiff's right to trial by jury in additur
cases and the equally recalcitrant defendant's right in remittitur cases, only
the receipt of the legal maximum and the payment of the legal minimum
respectively will suffice, then it follows that these must be also the only
amounts to which each would be entitled and which would satisfy their con-
stitutional right had the jury functioned in a legally permissible fashion in
57 Caudle v. Swanson, supra note 49, at 257, 103 S.E.2d at 363.
58 Carlin, supra note 22, at 17.
59 Carlin, supra note 22, at 17. Professor James has reached this same conclusion.
See James, supra note 17.
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rendering their verdict at the outset, for surely the right remains the same
in each case. It will be demonstrated that it is not the maximum and
minimum sums to which the parties are entitled in a so-called "normal" jury
trial situation. It is submitted that they are entitled at once to each and every
specific amount between and including the legal maximum and minimum
and to none of these.
Upon close scrutiny, this apparent antinomy is readily resolved. Let us
assume that in a case involving unliquidated damages the legal maximum that
the court would permit to stand is three thousand dollars and that the
minimum is one thousand dollars. It is therefore clear that a jury could
properly and legally return a verdict for either of these two amounts or any
of the literally thousands of amounts existing between one and three thousand
dollars, viz. between the ends of the legal spectrum. Thus, it is undeniable
that the winning party is entitled to a verdict of no specific dollar amount
but merely to what might be called a "legally permissible amount." A fortiori,
the defendant may only have rendered against him a verdict for this same
"legally permissible amount." The amount therefore to which each litigant
is entitled to have assessed either for or against him is but an abstract concept
and amount, having infinite specific dollar values which may be assigned to it
depending on the ad hoc determination of the jury in each individual case.
A properly functioning jury will, in all cases, theoretically render a verdict
for the "legally permissible amount."
One can imagine two identical cases involving different protagonists and
different juries in which the legal maximum and minimum are identical, yet
in which the plaintiffs receive different dollar verdicts. If both are within the
permissible ambits, then each party's right to trial by jury, as regards the
assessment of damages, has been satisfied, notwithstanding the disparity in
actual dollar amounts. This necessarily follows once it is realized that the
litigating parties are entitled respectively to receive and to pay only the
"legally permissible amount," rather than any specific dollar amount.
Assenting to the proposition that the parties' right to trial by jury remains
constant throughout judicial proceedings whether the situation be that of a
"normal" jury trial or that in which the procedure of additur is involved,
then that which satisfies the right in the former will most assuredly do so in
the latter. It has been demonstrated that in the "normal" jury situation the
verdict returned will be the "legally permissible amount." Hence, if this
same verdict would result from the invocation of the additur or remittitur
procedure, then that procedure cannot be said to offend the right to trial by
jury, for surely there has been no detriment suffered by the parties. Yet,
Professor Carlin's hypothesis tacitly, though inexorably, draws in its wake the
conclusion that a plaintiff's right to trial by jury would be satisfied if a
properly functioning jury were to return a verdict for less than the legal
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maximum, but that this same plaintiff, for whose benefit the court invoked the
additur, would have the same constitutional right denied if the same award
were presented to him in an additur situation. This is now seen to be an
untenable position. It results in and carries to a wasteful and impractical
extreme the logic of an absolute right of jury trial.
Professor Carlin seems to conclude that the right to trial by jury would
be satisfied in both additur and remittitur situations if there were benefit
conferred even though "the court and not the jury" had determined the
actual dollar verdict. This would seem to be correct since as the result of a
new trial nothing would be gained. In cases of remittitur where the verdict is
reduced to the "legally permissible recovery," it can scarcely be denied that
the defendant has been benefited by the procedure. He is required to pay less
in terms of dollars and cents than he was originally, but more importantly,
he is now obligated to pay only the "legally permissible amount," which is all
he would have had to pay had there initially been a properly functioning jury.
Conversely, in additur cases, the plaintiff, by virtue of the additur procedure,
has been awarded the "legally permissible recovery," which is all he would
have been entitled to had the jury not acted improvidently by returning a
legally impermissible verdict.
It would seem obvious that in both additur and remittitur cases the re-
spective procedures result in awarding the parties precisely what a properly
functioning jury would have given them. It is difficult, therefore, to under-
stand how anyone's right to trial by jury has been violated. The superfluity of
a new trial where the additur procedure is available is manifest.60
ADDITUR IN ILLINOIS
The practice of allowing remittitur in actions ex delicto was embraced very
early by the Illinois courts and was accepted here as elsewhere without much
question. 61 Today, the practice is given explicit recognition by the Illinois
Civil Practice Act.62 The practice of additur seems to have made its initial
6o While not enunciated in this fashion, this hypothesis has received implicit recog-
nition in several noteworthy state court opinions. See Caudle v. Swanson, supra note 49,
at 257, 103 S.E.2d at 363; Powers v. Allstate Insurance Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d
393 (1960); Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co., supra note 45.
61 See Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Scherman, 146 Ill. 540, 34 N.E. 801 (1893); Union
Rolling Mill Co. v. Gillen, 100 Ill. 52 (1881).
62 ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110 § 68.1(7) (1965): "A party who consents to a remittitur
as a condition to the denial of a new trial is not thereby precluded from asserting, on
appeal by the opposite party, that the amount of the verdict was proper."
See also ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110 § 92(1) (e): "In all appeals, the reviewing court may,
in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just, . . . (e) give any judgment and
make any order which ought to have been given, or made, and make any other and
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appearance in the United States in the Illinois case of Carr v. Miner.1 In
that case, a suit in assumpsit was brought to recover a liquidated sum of
money wrongfully appropriated by the defendant. The jury allowed interest
at six percent. However, the evidence clearly established that the defendant
had always recognized his liability to pay ten percent, which was lawful
at that time. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which, upon the
defendant agreeing that the verdict should be raised was overruled and judg-
ment entered for the plaintiff for the increased amount. On appeal it was
urged that the trial court did not have the power to overrule the motion. In
denying this contention, the court responded:
If there were no other grounds requiring a new trial to be granted, and we see
none, then, when that was corrected, there was no error in overruling the motion.
It was a case in which the amount could be calculated with certainty when the
basis was found. The practice is one that should be sparingly indulged, and should
never be adopted except in clear cases.64
One year later, came the case of James v. Morey,6 5 in which, in an action
for rent, the jury returned a verdict for $26.48. Yet, the evidence showed that
if there were any liability it should be for the sum of $144.54. The plaintiff
petitioned the court for a new trial. It was denied when the defendant agreed
to an additur for the amount of the difference between the jury's verdict
and what was patently due under the evidence. On appeal, it was again urged
that the trial court was without authority to order such an increase, and that
its only action was to grant a new trial. On the authority of Carr, the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's action.
There can be no question that in Illinois, as in Alabama, Delaware, Kansas,
and Missouri, additur may be employed when the amount of damages is
liquidated or ascertainable from the evidence.66 Both the Carr and Morey
cases posit this proposition. Yet, are they authority for denying the court
the additur power in cases where damages are unliquidated? It is submitted
that they cannot serve as precedent for those who seek to proscribe additur.
The holdings in both these early Illinois decisions were addressed to sustain-
ing additur in a particular type of case, viz. that involving liquidated
damages, and not to denying it in other types of cases. Hence, it is a non
further orders and grant any relief, including .. . the entry of a remittitur . . ." It is
important to note that while remittitur is given explicit recognition by the Illinois Civil
Practice Act, additur is nowhere mentioned.
6342 Ill. 179 (1866).
641d. at 192.
6544 Ill. 352 (1867).
66 See cases collected in Bender, Additur-The Power oj the Trial Court to Deny a
New Trial on the Condition That Damages Be Increased, 3 CALn. W. L. REv. 1, 21
(1967).
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sequitur to say that they expressly or inferentially are authority for denying
the additur power where the case involves unliquidated damages. Indeed,
a careful reading of the Carr case seems to dispel this notion, for the court
noted that the amount of the additur might not be exactly the amount which
would be required to give the plaintiff that to which he was legally entitled
under the evidence. The court observed that the additur only "seems to be
about the difference in the two rates of interest." 67 It is vital to note the
enabling or positive nature of these two early Illinois cases and to note that
they are devoid of any language from which it can be inferred that additur
is an improper procedure in any case not involving liquidated damages.
In 1955, in Yep Hong v. Williams,"5 an Illinois court was apparently first
presented with a case in which additur was employed by a trial court where
unliquidated damages were. at issue. The plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant for injuries sustained as the result of the defendant's alleged
negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for one thousand
dollars. There was sufficient evidence to warrant the trial judge to grant un-
conditionally the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the grounds of inade-
quacy of the verdict.6 9 However, the court ordered an additur as a condition
to denying the plaintiff's motion. The defendant refused to consent, and the
motion for a. new trial was granted. The defendant appealed from the lower
court's ruling. The plaintiff, in the instant case, did not. argue that the trial
court had the authority to impose an additur. He merely urged that since
the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court
had not abused its discretion in awarding him a new trial. The Illinois
Appellate Court agreed with this contention and confirmed the order of the
trial court granting a new trial. However, they went on to consider the
question of whether the courts in Illinois possessed the additur power in cases
involving unliquidated damages.
Justice Burke's opinion was. laconic and wholly inappropriate in view of
the gravity of the issues involved. It relied on the triune of Dimick, Carr and
Morey. It quoted at length from the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Dimick, which has been shown to be most unpersuasive. In Yep Hong
critical analysis is conspicuous by its absence. The court made no mention of
the excoriations to which Dimick has been subjected nor of the tendency of
the state courts to depart from its questionable rationale. 70
67 Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179, 192 (1866).
68 Yep Hong v. Williams, 6 Ill. App. 2d 456, 128 N.E.2d 655 (1955).
69 While in Illinois, as in the other American jurisdictions, new trials were originally
not allowed for inadequate verdicts, the modern rule here and elsewhere is that a new
trial may be granted where the verdict is inadequate. See Williams v. Reynolds, 86 I1.
263 (1877); Harris v. Minardi, 74 Ill. App. 2d 262, 220 N.E.2d 39 (1966); Codey* v.
Commercial Fire Insurance Co., 13 Ill. App. 110 (1883).
70 See collection of cases in Bender, supra note 66, at 20.
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The appellate court's reliance on Carr and Morey is to lean upon a slender
reed. Neither of these cases supports the court's conclusion that "a trial
court in a tort action for the recovery of unliquidated damages is without
power to enlarge the verdict of a jury by . . .additur." 7' These cases merely
sustain the additur power under a particular set of circumstances; they do not
deny it under others. There are further considerations which the court failed
to take into account. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant consented to nor
requested the additur order. On this basis Yep Hong is distinguishable from
those cases on which it was predicated. 72 It is strange that the court nowhere
mentioned the Illinois Constitution nor even why a trial court may not order
an additur. It is clear, of course, that the only objection to additur is that it
may result in a deprivation of the right to trial by jury, which is guaranteed
by the Illinois Constitution.73
Dimick was based on the "re-examination" clause of the seventh ammend-
ment rather than the "shall be preserved" clause.74 If additur is precluded
in the federal courts by virtue of a provision in the Federal Constitution
having no counterpart in the Illinois Constitution, it is difficult to understand
how Dimick can serve, as the basis for holding additur to be beyond the
ambits of an Illinois trial court's powers. Perhaps in ,the final analysis the
court saps the decision of authority by its own words. The court did not
obviate the use of additur in cases of unliquidated damages. It did not assert
that additur was unconstitutional; it merely stated: "The device seems to be
limited to cases where the inadequacy of the verdict is due to the omission
of some specific, definitely calculable item."
7 5
It is believed that Yep Hong does not preclude the use of additur by a
trial court in Illinois, and that its dichotomous import should not be so inter-
preted. It is submitted that the decision promulgated but two propositions
both of which have received prior enunciation. The first proposition is that
additur may be employed by a trial court in a case where the jury's verdict
is inadequate, and the damages are liquidated or ascertainable. 76 This hold-
7' Supra note 68, at.460, 128 N.E.2d at 657.
72 As to the power of a trial court to order an additur or remittitur over the objec-
tions of one or both the litigants, see Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 213 (1957).
73 "The right to trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate . .. .
ILL. CONST., art. 2, § 5 (1870).
74 Bender, supra note 66, at 11 n.53; Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co., supra note 45, at
285 n.17, 427 P.2d at 997 n.17.
75 Supra note 71 (emphasis added).
76 It is assumed that the verdict is not the result of passion or prejudice ..and is
not a compromise verdict, for in such, cases, in Illinois, remittitur as well as additur
would be improper. The court's action in such a situation is to order a new trial on
all issues. See Manus v. Feist, 76 Ill. App. 2d 99, 221 N.E.2d 418 (1966); Kinsel v.
Hawthorne, 27 Ill. App. 2d 314, 169 N.E.2d 678 (1960).
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ing, therefore, merely reaffirms Carr and Morey. The second and more im-
portant holding is that a trial court is without power to "enlarge the verdict
of a jury by an arbritary additur" 77 in actions ex delicto where unliquidated
damages are involved. The court's use of the word "arbitrary" is believed not
to refer to the action of the trial court in setting the quantum of the award,
but rather to the officiousness of the court's action in ordering the additur.
That is, where the plaintiff has not requested or the defendant not assented
to an additur, it is improper for the court, sua sponte, to attempt to impose
one. The recognition by the appellate court that neither party was privy to,
nor the efficient cause of, the trial court's action is most significant. Yet, this
posture is not novel nor is it peculiar to additur.
Unquestionably, in Illinois, on motion for a new trial, it is not error for the
trial court either to allow or to require the plaintiff to enter a remittitur as a
condition to its denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial based on
excessiveness of award. However, the court may not, sua sponte, enter or
impose a remittitur upon the plaintiff without his consent; to do so is re-
versible error. 78 It is submitted that the holding in Yep Hong in no way
militates against the use of additur in Illinois in cases of unliquidated
damages provided the court does not act on its own motion and without the
defendant's consent.
Thus, it is believed that the status of additur in Illinois in cases involving
unliquidated damages is not as yet settled. The final word remains to be
spoken. Before it is, however, the Illinois courts will surely examine the atti-
tudes of their sister states, several of which have held that additur does not
deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional right to a jury determination of the
amount of damages. This group of decisions includes not only the more recent
but the better reasoned opinions on the subject.79 In each case, the trial court
entered an additur order the effect of which was to increase the verdict and
deny the plaintiff's motion for a new trial because the defendant consented.
The plaintiff's contention on appeal of deprivation of the right to a jury trial
was rejected. In general, the opinions stressed the fact that it was in the
interest of the sound administration of justice to determine the rights of
litigants in one trial and avoid new trials, and that additur does not prejudice
the rights of a plaintiff any more than remittitur prejudices the rights of a
defendant.
To the impressive array of state supreme court opinions upholding additur
may now be added one more, and one which promises to have a profound
and far reaching influence on future decisions in Illinois and other forums. In
77 Supra note 71.
'78 Andres v. Green, 71 Ill. App. 2d 375, 129 N.E.2d 430 (1955) ; Hesse v. Zaffke,
183 Ill. App. 160 (1913).
79 See cases collected in Bender, supra note 66, at 20.
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June, 1967, Mr. Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme
Court, announced the decision in Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co.,80 sustaining
the constitutionality of additur in California. In so doing, the court expressly
overruled its prior contrary decision in Dorsey v. Barba.81
Justice Traynor's majority opinion in Jehl closely parallels his dissenting
opinion in Dorsey. In essence, the court could find no reason why "defendants
should be denied the advantage of additur when they are required to submit
to remittitur. ' 8 2 The court, in reevaluating Dimick and Dorsey found their
"arguments unpersuasive when considered in the light of the demands of fair
and efficient administration of justice. '8 3 The court concluded by asserting
that additur does not detract from the substance of the common law trial
by jury.8 4 When the Illinois Supreme Court finally examines the question of
additur in its entirety, their ultimate determination may well be influenced by
Justice Traynor's opinion in the Jehl case.
CONCLUSION
The efficacy of remittitur in promoting the fair and efficient administration
of justice without detracting from the substance of the right to trial by
jury is no longer seriously questioned. In light of the arguments adduced
earlier, it is difficult to fathom why additur would not be an equally salutory
device. The demands of a fair and efficient administration of justice must
be considered in the context of the pressures placed upon the judicial
machinery by the incessant rise in the number of civil cases filed each year.85
The social and economic costs of overcrowded court dockets increase in
geometric proportions to this annual rise. The situation is rapidly becoming
critical and solutions such as additur must be speedily employed.
This is not to say that additur's justification is mere expediency, for ex-
pediency will never suffice to overcome valid constitutional objections nor
render benign that which is legally dysgenic. It is merely to take cognizance
of reality and to attempt to devise ameliorating methods and procedures
which are consonant with the contemporary requirements of our society. It
is believed that additur is such a procedure, that it is constitutional, and
that its use within a proper and responsible judicial framework should not
be discouraged.
Jeffrey Cole
80 Supra note 45.
8138 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952).
s2 Supra note 45, at 280-81, 427 P.2d at 992-93.
93 Id.
8 4Id. at 283, 427 P.2d at 995.
85 Id. at 281, 427 P.2d at 993. See also Fitzgerald, The Problem of Delay In the
Courts: Cook County 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 137.
